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ABSTRACT
The development of artificial intelligence (AI) models that are capable of predicting the
decisions of prominent courts – most notably the European Court of Human Rights and
United States Supreme Court – provides us with an opportunity to revisit important
jurisprudential debates regarding the quest for legal certainty. Through providing clear
distinctions within formalistic jurisprudence, and its, subsequent, realist critique; this thesis
seeks to analyze legal decision-making and its relationship with artificial intelligence. I
argue that, AI’s deterministic nature and its support for the law being an “entirely selfcontained process” does lend some credence to certain jurisprudential arguments.
However, this should not be misconstrued as support for a formalistic approach towards
legal certainty. Rather, AI’s empirical attempt at understanding the contributing factors
that create a legal decision, reaffirms a functional understanding of the law. Moreover,
through highlighting the definitional issues of AI, its problematic facets and existing case
law, this thesis seeks to provide a more nuanced comprehension of AI within the legal
industry. I further argue that, inversed-AI models possess inherent inadequacies and,
consequently, are at fundamental odds with the decision-making process; thus, preventing
them from being reliable indicators of AI’s potential in the legal process. This is supported
by the emergence of legal frameworks, the “General Data Protection Regulation” and “Loi
de Programmation” in particular, that stipulate “explainability” and “understandability” as
necessary benchmarks for the use of AI.
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I.

Introduction
The emergence of artificial intelligence (AI) provides a new opportunity to look

afresh at our jurisprudential understanding of legal certainty. With its global investment
expecting to top 150 billion euros by 2025, AI is actively permeating our society by
performing feats that were deemed to be impossible, or require a high-level of specialized
knowledge.1 Driverless cars have been developed and approved, with many countries
having amended the Vienna Convention on Road Traffic to incorporate automated
vehicles;2 in the financial sector, firms are deploying AI to analyze stock market patterns3
and build investment portfolios4; in the medical industry, AI is continuously utilized for its
ability to provide predictive diagnoses and image analysis;5 in the creative industry, AI is
also generating intellectual property (IP).6
In the legal sector, AI is used to assist judges in identifying legal precedent, drafting
contracts, creating due diligence reports, predicting case outcomes, determining litigation
risk and evaluating litigation funding opportunities.7 Several countries have begun
1

Alessandro Mascellino, Global AI investment to top £150 billion by 2025, OUTSIDE INSIGHT (2019),
https://outsideinsight.com/insights/global-ai-investment-150-billion-2025/ (last visited Mar 15, 2021);
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE MARKET SIZE, GROWTH, SHARE | ANALYSIS [2020-2027], ,
https://www.fortunebusinessinsights.com/industry-reports/artificial-intelligence-market-100114 (last
visited Mar 25, 2021).
2
UNECE paves the way for automated driving by updating UN international convention | UNECE, ,
https://unece.org/press/unece-paves-way-automated-driving-updating-un-international-convention (last
visited Mar 23, 2021).
3
Arash Bahrammirzaee, A comparative survey of artificial intelligence applications in finance: artificial
neural networks, expert system and hybrid intelligent systems, 19 NEURAL COMPUT & APPLIC 1165–1195
(2010).
4
Id.
5
Office of the Commissioner, FDA permits marketing of artificial intelligence-based device to detect
certain diabetes-related eye problems, FDA (2020), https://www.fda.gov/news-events/pressannouncements/fda-permits-marketing-artificial-intelligence-based-device-detect-certain-diabetes-relatedeye (last visited Mar 15, 2021); Lucy Colback, The impact of AI on business and society, FINANCIAL TIMES
(2020), https://www.ft.com/content/e082b01d-fbd6-4ea5-a0d2-05bc5ad7176c (last visited Mar 15, 2021).
6
Ana Ramalho, Will Robots Rule the (Artistic) World? A Proposed Model for the Legal Status of Creations
by Artificial Intelligence Systems, LEIDEN UNIVERSITY (2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2987757
(last visited Mar 23, 2021); Ryan Abbott, Artificial Intelligence, Big Data and Intellectual Property:
Protecting Computer-Generated Works in the United Kingdom, RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND DIGITAL TECHNOLOGIES (TANYA APLIN, ED), EDWARD ELGAR PUBLISHING LTD,
FORTHCOMING (2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3064213 (last visited Mar 23, 2021); Benjamin
Sobel, Artificial Intelligence’s Fair Use Crisis, COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF LAW & THE ARTS (2017),
https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3032076 (last visited Mar 23, 2021).
7
Marcos Eduardo Kauffman & Marcelo Negri Soares, AI in legal services: new trends in AI-enabled legal
services, 14 SOCA 223–226 (2020); ArbiLex, Launch of ArbiLex Brings AI and Predictive Analytics to
International Arbitration, https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/launch-of-arbilex-brings-ai-and-
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modernizing their judiciary services to accommodate for AI. The French government
issued the Loi de Programmation de Justice 2018-2022 (LPJ) with the purpose of
increasing access to judicial decisions – that were previously confidential – and creating
guidelines to ease in AI.8 In Pyrrho Investments Ltd. v. MWB Property Ltd. (MWB) AI –
specifically predictive coding – was employed to optimize online discovery for the first
time in the United Kingdom.9 In the United States (US), courts have even begun using AI
tools (predictive analytics) in the decision-making process to determine bail and parole
cases.10 Pre-dating and in parallel to the aforementioned developments, researchers have
compared AI’s ability to predict judicial decisions to that of humans. For instance, a study
showed that a human expert group – comprised of eminent lawyers and law professors –
guessed the votes of individual US Supreme Court justices in upcoming decisions for the
2002 term at an accuracy of 59.1 percent; while the model achieved a predication rate of
75%.11
The emergence of AI, in the legal field, and its reliance on ‘big data’ raises
important questions about the deterministic nature of the law, and how we understand the
judicial decision-making process. Accordingly, this thesis seeks to revisit these
jurisprudential debates in order to assess AI’s disruptive capabilities and answer questions
relating to legal determinism. In this thesis, an important distinction is made. Firstly, AI
can manifest itself in “versed-AI”. This constitutes trained AI, where the algorithm is
developed in collaboration with a human that is also providing data analysis. This bottomup approach for data analysis possesses the least ‘problematic’ traits that are associated

predictive-analytics-to-international-arbitration-300896058.html (last visited Oct 15, 2020); Frederick
Daso, ArbiLex, A Harvard Law School Legal Tech Startup, Uses AI To Settle Arbitrations, FORBES ,
https://www.forbes.com/sites/frederickdaso/2020/02/04/arbilex-a-harvard-law-school-legal-tech-startupuses-ai-to-settle-arbitrations/ (last visited Oct 15, 2020); eBrevia | AI for Intelligent Contract Analytics, ,
EBREVIA , https://ebrevia.com (last visited Oct 15, 2020); ROSS Intelligence Features, , ROSS
INTELLIGENCE , https://rossintelligence.com/features.html (last visited Oct 15, 2020).
8
LOI DE PROGRAMMATION DE JUSTICE 2018-2022, (2019),
https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/loda/id/JORFTEXT000038261631/.
9
Pyrrho Investments Ltd v MWB Property Ltd & Ors, (2016),
https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Ch/2016/256.html.
10
Aleš Završnik, Criminal justice, artificial intelligence systems, and human rights, 20 ERA FORUM 567–
583 (2020).
11
Theodore Ruger et al., Supreme Court Forecasting Project: Legal and Political Science Approaches to
Supreme Court Decision-Making 58, 1152; Maxi Scherer, Artificial Intelligence and Legal DecisionMaking: The Wide Open? Study on the Example of International Arbitration, QUEEN MARY SCHOOL OF
LAW, 9 (2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3392669 (last visited Mar 21, 2021).
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with AI. A secondary form, which I will call “inversed-AI” employs a top-down approach,
where the AI is not trained, it interprets the data first, and then develops the algorithm. This
form of AI involves the least human input and has been used to predict the judicial decision
of the United States (US) Supreme Court and the European Court of Human Rights
(ECtHR).
Literature discussing the symbiosis of AI and law, is not novel. Several scholars
have attempted to explore their relationship by focusing on ethical debates,12 human
rights,13 technical inadequacies of AI14 and some have even ventured as far as to argue that
the international framework governing commercial arbitration – mainly the New York
Convention and UNCITRAL Model Law – allows for fully autonomous AI-arbitrators.15
However, very few papers have discussed AI’s impact on legal theory.
What separates this paper, within jurisprudential analysis, is (1) it expands the AI
analysis to incorporate versed-AI (2) highlights the conceptual and legal barriers to
utilizing inversed-AI in judicial decision-making and (3) engages with studies regarding
the impact of AI on comparative jurisprudence. Chapter I seeks to: outline the definitional
debate surrounding AI, showcase its different forms, and demonstrate its emerging trends
in the legal market. Furthermore, this chapter provides an in-depth analysis of AI practice
in decision-making, and conducts a critical study of versed and inversed-AI models to
determine their efficacy for outcome prediction. This is because a nuanced and technical
understanding of AI is crucial in order to, holistically, assess its impact on legal
determinism.

12

Ugo Pagallo, When Morals Ain’t Enough: Robots, Ethics, and the Rules of the Law, 27 MINDS AND
MACHINES, https://link-springer-com.libproxy.aucegypt.edu/article/10.1007/s11023-017-9418-5 (last
visited Mar 25, 2021); Margarita Carrilo, Artificial intelligence: From ethics to law, 44 SCIENCEDIRECT,
https://www-sciencedirectcom.libproxy.aucegypt.edu/science/article/pii/S030859612030029X?via%3Dihub (last visited Mar 25,
2021).
13
FILIPPO A. RASO ET AL., Artificial Intelligence & Human Rights: Opportunities & Risks (2018),
https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3259344 (last visited Oct 14, 2020); PROMOTION, PROTECTION AND
ENJOYMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS ON THE INTERNET: WAYS TO BRIDGE THE GENDER DIGITAL DIVIDE FROM A
HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVE, (2017), https://documents-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G17/111/81/PDF/G1711181.pdf?OpenElement.
14
Matthew Scherer, Regulating Artificial Intelligence Systems: Risks, Challenges, Competencies, and
Strategies, 29 HARVARD JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY Page (2016).
15
HORST EIDENMUELLER & FAIDON VARESIS, What is an Arbitration? Artificial Intelligence and the
Vanishing Human Arbitrator (2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3629145 (last visited Oct 14, 2020).
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Put forth by the likes of Jerome Frank, Max Weber, Ronald Dworkin and Herbert
Hart, Chapter II seeks to engage with the jurisprudential debate regarding decision-making,
legal determinism and the predictive nature of the law. This is done by outlining the
evolution of the formalistic position, from Weber’s position on the deterministic nature of
the law, till Dworkin and Hart’s distinctions of clear and hard cases. This assessment
cannot be complete without engaging with Jerome Frank’s radical realist position regarding
the absurdity of a deterministic system, and Felix Cohen’s functional approach. It is
through the aforementioned lens that I evaluate the modern implications of AI and how
they impact legal theory. As a result of the aforementioned points, legal issues will arise.
Are modern iterations of versed and inversed-AI reliable examples for legal decisionmaking? Does AI’s capability for outcome prediction further affirm Frank’s position on
the indeterminacy of the law? Does it affirm the classical formalist position? Or does AI
seemingly confirm Dworkin’s position?
The paper uses modern iterations of AI, as well as the ECtHR and US Supreme
Court models as detailed examples. However, it does not engage with the political/moral
argument surrounding the object and purpose of the law – as this angle is outside the
intended scope of this paper. It concludes that (a) inversed-AI is not an effective method
for determining AI’s potential for ex ante outcome prediction (b) there is both a conceptual,
and a legal barrier towards using inversed-AI in judicial decision-making (c) despite AI’s
reaffirmation of legal certainty, it, on a fundamental level, supports a functional approach
to law; as it is the latest step in empirically understanding the contributive factors of the
decision-making process.

4

II.

Artificial Intelligence

A. Defining Artificial Intelligence
According to the United Nations (UN) International Telecommunication Union (ITU)
– the UN’s specialized agency for information communication technologies (ICTs) –
Artificial Intelligence (AI) is defined as machines that achieve “the ability to learn, improve
and make calculated decisions in ways that will enable them to perform tasks previously
thought to rely on human experience, creativity and ingenuity”.16 This is a broad definition
that provides a general overview of what AI is and what it can be. Nevertheless, from a
legal perspective, there is no globally adopted definition of AI.17
One of the main difficulties in defining AI lies in the “conceptual ambiguity of
intelligence.”18 According to Matthew Scherer, human beings are incapable of reconciling
with an abstract idea of intelligence that is separate from their own.19 This is because,
among their own, human beings are the only ones that possess intelligence. This causes the
first issue in defining AI: separating definitions of intelligence from human
characteristics.20 This is exemplified in the statements of John McCarthy – the person who
first coined the term ‘artificial intelligence’ – as he emphasized that we are unable to define
intelligence without relating it back to human intelligence.21 Accordingly, attempting to
define AI without defining intelligence, in of itself, is a monumental task; due to the
interconnected variables that are considered as exhibiting intelligence, such as: the ability
to learn, adapt and reason.22
The aforementioned issues in defining intelligence, translate seamlessly into the issues
of defining AI. As made clear in the works of Stuart Russel and Peter Norvig, authors of
the leading introductory textbook on AI, Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach. In

16

AI for Good Global Summit - International Telecommunications Union, , AI FOR GOOD GLOBAL SUMMIT
2020 , https://aiforgood.itu.int/about-us/ (last visited Oct 14, 2020).
17
John McCarthy, What is Artificial Intelligence?, 2–3 (2017), http://wwwformal.stanford.edu/jmc/whatisai.pdf.
18
Scherer, supra note 14 at 359.
19
Id. at 359–360.
20
Id. at 360.
21
McCarthy, supra note 17; Scherer, supra note 14.
22
Scherer, supra note 14 at 360.
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their book, they posit that there are eight different definitions of AI, which they organized
into four categories: thinking humanly, acting humanly, thinking rationally, and acting
rationally.23 Today, AI is utilized as an umbrella term that zeroes-in on the concept of
achieving technological ‘goals’.24 AI is viewed as a “rational agent” that “acts so as to
achieve the best outcome or, when there is uncertainty, the best expected outcome”.25
This creates a regulatory dilemma, due to the fact that it simply replaces the issue of
defining “intelligence”, with the issue of defining “goal”.26 On the other hand, if we choose
to adopt a working definition for AI under the framework of ‘acting rationally’, we would
be both omitting and including several facets that make AI unique.27 This is because the
notion of ‘acting rationally’ already exists in several computer programs that pose no
serious risk, nor do they create a need for regulation; examples of this includes computer
chess programs or AI opponents in other computer games.28 As they too attempt to
optimize results within a predefined set of guidelines, which could be considered as acting
“rationally”.29
It is important to note, AI includes a variety of computational techniques that aim to
optimize the ability of a machine’s performance; through things such as natural language
processing (NLP) and pattern recognition. This loose conceptualization is not accidental,
as what is considered AI changes from time to time; this is what is known as the “AI effect”
or the “odd paradox”.30 The “AI effect” is the notion that highly successful technological
advancements eventually become mundane and start being taken for granted. This entails
losing its privilege as being categorized as AI, while newer and more impressive systems
are labelled as AI instead.31 This thesis does not attempt to solve the definitional issue of

23

STUART RUSSEL & PETER NORVIG, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: A MODERN APPROACH 1034 (2003),
https://www.pearsonhighered.com/assets/preface/0/1/3/6/0136042597.pdf.
24
Scherer, supra note 14 at 361.
25
RUSSEL AND NORVIG, supra note 23 at 4.
26
Scherer, supra note 14 at 361.
27
Id. at 362.
28
Id. at 362.
29
Id. at 362.
30
RASO ET AL., supra note 13 at 10.
31
PAMELA MCCORDUCK, MACHINES WHO THINK: A PERSONAL INQUIRY INTO THE HISTORY AND
PROSPECTS OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (2004),
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/965b/39ad83c545849d473ce30cfc3d569f6e3828.pdf?_ga=2.11940724.131
6760708.1602666827-833432709.1602666827.
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AI, but will define AI – for the purposes of this paper – as “a family of computational
algorithms that are capable of automated statistical learning, based on data sets”.32
1. Machine Learning
AI is comprised of two key subsets: Machine Learning (ML) and Deep Learning
Modules (DLM). ML is an algorithm that is used to make predictions.33 This is a stark
difference from normalized methods of statistics that rely on models.34 It is true that
traditional statistical methods can also generate predictions; however, this only occurs
when said model fits seamlessly within the process that is being modeled.35 Moreover, the
traditional statistical methodology requires that the analyst first specifies an equation that
clearly indicates the outcome (result) variable, this is what is known as a regression.36 A
regression is, in essence, an estimate of the relationship between two types of variables that
are both “selected and specified by the analyst”.37 The results of the regression usually
represents real world relationships that the analyst is attempting to use in order to support
casual inferences.38
Machine Learning is quite the opposite of that; in the sense that it does not require
the analyst to zero-in on a particular form of model in advance. ML algorithms require data
to determine which information is placed in the input (data) variables in order to present
the output (result) variable.39 The main distinction to be made from ML and traditional
statistical models is that ML results cannot claim to represent real world relationships while
traditional statistical models allow us to make inferences from its data.40

32

Allyson Renolds & Paula Mendez, AI arbitrator selection tools and diversity on arbitral panels,
INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION , https://www.ibanet.org/article/97CB79FA-39E9-48C1-8CB045569E2E62AF (last visited Jul 21, 2021).
33
Cary Coglianese & David Lehr, Regulating by Robot: Administrative Decision Making in the MachineLearning Era, UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA CAREY LAW SCHOOL Page, 156 (2017).
34
Id. at 1156.
35
Id. at 1156–1157.
36
Id. at 1156–1157.
37
Coglianese and Lehr, supra note 33.
38
Id. at 1156–1157.
39
Id. at 1156–1157.
40
Coglianese and Lehr, supra note 33.
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It is important to note that traditional statistical models are not more
reliable/important than ML. On the contrary, what makes ML unique is that its
mathematical algorithms learn to evolve, adapt and optimize their forecasts based on new
data or past experiences.41 However, one of the main drawbacks of ML is that it comes at
an interpretative cost, referred to as the “black box”.42 This interpretive cost occurs when
the algorithm attempts to optimize its performance criterion, and the analyst can no longer
determine which relationship between the variables is factoring in its classifications or
how, specifically, the algorithm is putting together said classifications. 43 Despite this
interpretative cost, ML algorithms are being implemented at an increasing rate, in a
multitude of different fields.
There are generally two types of ML: supervised and unsupervised. Generally
speaking, supervised learning involves training the algorithm through labeling.44 This is
done by feeding the algorithm with both the correct decision and an input. An example for
this would be requiring the algorithm to differentiate between faces and objects in a scene:
trees, streets and what not.45 This would be done by providing the algorithm with an image
and an index of faces and objects. After providing the algorithm with several other pairs of
images and indices, the algorithm would adjust its methodology to incorporate for
situations where the image might not even contain a face.46 If we utilize the same
aforementioned example, the distinction between both technologies would be that in
unsupervised learning, the AI would be required to determine if there exists a face within
the image, without being given the index in its formative stages.47

41

Id.
Yavar Bathaee, The Artificial Intelligence Black Box and the Failure of Intent and Causation, 31
HARVARD JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY 50.
43
Id. at 899–900.
44
Argyro Karanaslou & Dimitris Pinotsis, A Study Into the Layers of Automated Decision-making:
Emergent Normative and Legal Aspects of Deep Learning, 31 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF LAW,
COMPUTERS & TECHNOLOGY, 170–187 (2017), https://doiorg.libproxy.aucegypt.edu/10.1080/13600869.2017.1298499.
45
Nakajima Chikahito, People Recognition in Image Sequences by Supervised Learning, MASSACHUSETTS
INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE LABORATORY (2000),
https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.892.9790&rep=rep1&type=pdf.
46
Id.
47
Dinesh Kumar, Chandra Rai & Shakti Kumar, Analysis of Unsupervised Learning Techniques for Face
Recognition, 20 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF IMAGING SYSTEMS AND TECHNOLOGY 261–267 (2010).
42
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2. Deep Learning Modules
Deep Learning is a subset of ML that gains its edge from being a more specific method
of learning. What makes DLM unique is that its models are composed of several layers that
are constantly processing information, and are capable of learning data with several levels
of abstraction.48 The benefits of DLM are evident in areas such as natural language
processing, Q&A answering systems, e-discovery, technology assisted reviews, improving
search engines and visual object recognition.49 Furthermore, “Deep learning discovers
intricate structure in large data sets … to indicate how a machine should change its internal
parameters that are used to compute the representation in each layer from the representation
in the previous layer.”50 The accumulation of the aforementioned techniques undoubtedly
cuts costs and increases efficiency. However, the drawbacks include the “lack of intuitive
interpretability” which “is of little concern in endeavors where accuracy, not causality, is
the valued metric.”51 This is supported by the current practice of AI in notable sectors.

48

Yann LeCunn, Yoshua Bengio & Geoffrey Hinton, Deep Learning, NATURE 436–444 (2015).
Id. at 436–444.
50
LeCunn, Bengio, and Hinton, supra note 48.
51
Coglianese and Lehr, supra note 33 at 1160.
49
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B. Artificial Intelligence in Law
The purpose of this section is to demonstrate the current role of artificial intelligence
in the field of law. This will be done by presenting several examples of companies,
applications and products that use AI to perform specific legal tasks that were previously
done, exclusively, by individuals. Through these examples, we will be capable of seeing
the extent to which AI is impacting the legal sector. Secondly, this section provides a
critical engagement with the most highly regarded AI-models that have demonstrated an
ability to predict the judicial decisions of the US Supreme Court and the European Court
of Human Rights. Thirdly, this section analyzes the role that AI-algorithms currently play
in US courts when it comes to assessing recidivism rates in parole hearings. This is done
by providing a critical assessment of the Wisconsin v. Loomis case, where the utilization
of an AI-algorithm was alleged to violate an individual’s human and due process rights. I
will also be presenting unique examples of Online Dispute Resolution (ODR) – a form of
automated dispute resolution that exists in the field of e-commerce – in order to
demonstrate parallels between the adjudication of small disputes in ODR and potential AIled decision-making.
Despite AI’s drawbacks, global experts are unanimous in their belief that AI will
continuously develop and produce new methods for improving legal services and access to
justice.52 The White & Case Queen Mary 2018 International Arbitration Survey stated that
AI was used by 8% of its participants.53 To put this number into perspective, artificial
intelligence was not even mentioned in their 2015 International Arbitration Survey.54
Accordingly, if we assume any rate of progress, AI’s role in the legal field cannot be
understated or ignored.
Deep learning examples include tools for e-discovery, evidence review, search engines,
analysis of pleadings and contract writing. These models help improve the work of a lawyer
as they automate several important tasks that were previously exclusive to individuals.
52

Kauffman and Soares, supra note 7.
2018 INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION SURVEY: THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, (2018),
https://www.whitecase.com/sites/whitecase/files/files/download/publications/qmul-internationalarbitration-survey-2018-19.pdf.
54
2015 INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION SURVEY: IMPROVEMENTS AND INNOVATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION, (2015), https://www.whitecase.com/sites/whitecase/files/files/download/publications/qmulinternational-arbitration-survey-2015_0.pdf.
53
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Machine learning examples are more so in the realm of probability and prediction. This
includes companies that are hired by firms for arbitrator selection.55 This is done by
reviewing a specific judge’s case law to determine how that judge would adjudicate in the
firm’s arbitration case.
A prominent example of machine learning in commercial arbitration is ArbiLex.
Founded by Isabel Yang, ArbiLex is a startup that uses ML to: (1) assist law firms and
litigation funds in ranking arbitrators for a specific case56 (2) determine and pinpoint the
relevant risk factors in a particular dispute and (3) predict how long a case would last.57
The main beneficiaries of this statistical analysis are law firms and third-party litigation
funds, that are searching for an advantage in a legal sector that is slowly transforming into
a multitrillion-dollar asset class.58
JPMorgan has developed Contract Intelligence, a proprietary program that has
decreased their annual contract review time by 360,000 hours.59 In China, the Supreme
People’s Court developed a software called FaXin that is designed to aid judges in
identifying case precedent.60 eBrevia uses e-discovery in order to “reduce manual review
time by 30-90% while also increasing accuracy. [It also] analyzes 50+ documents in less
than a minute and minimizes the risk of missing key information.”61 TrademarkNow and
Anaqua are examples of AI-programs that conduct risk assessments and IP research for
intellectual property lawyers.62 Intraspexion is another company used by law firms to
determine the risks involved in litigation.63 ROSS Intelligence is a natural language
processing AI that provides a question & answer style structure. It also performs document
analysis, finds similar language in other case law and provides a tailor-made case summary
for lawyers and law firms.64
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The role of AI in improving document automation cannot be overstated. Keoghs – a
law firm in the UK – is using AI to automate litigation in claims relating to personal
injury.65 Specifio is another example of an AI-based program that is capable of drafting a
patent application; provided certain claims are proposed.66 WeVorce and Hello Divorce,
are examples of AI that operate in family law; as both programs are capable of automating
divorce-related proceedings. PerfectNDA, created by Neota Logic, streamlines the nondisclosure agreement process, which can save approximately 1000 hours annually.67
Additionally, LegalMation utilizes AI to generate any and all litigation documents i.e.
pleadings or discovery requests.68
The majority, if not the entirety, of information available to parties to a litigation is
what is known as electronically stored information (ESI). The modern, digital nature of the
legal profession has “[lead] to large volumes of ESI being created, duplicated and stored
in a variety of formats, locations and jurisdictions”.69 Currently, several aspects of litigation
discovery – namely the ESI – are conducted by ML algorithms.70 These algorithms are
primarily used to categorize and filter documents, by determining their level of relevance
or duplication.71 This is what is known as predictive coding. Predictive coding is used to
categorize, process and evaluate data that lawyers would need to sift through before
assessing whether or not they have a case. “The parties agree a predictive coding protocol,
including the definition of the data set, sample size, batches, control set, reviewers,
confidence level and margin of error. Criteria will include who held the documents
(custodians) and the date range, but perhaps also whether the documents contained any of
the keywords chosen. Certain types of documents, not having any or any sufficient text,
will be excluded (they will have to be considered manually). The resulting documents are
“cleaned up”, by removing repeated content (e.g. email headers or disclaimers) and words
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that will not be indexed (e.g. because they are not useful in assessing relevance).”72 This
significantly expedites the document review process, especially since the AI is constantly
improving with every document it analyzes.
At face-value this may seem benign, but in cases with large scale disclosure, predictive
coding can make a substantial difference. A prominent example of its use is the MWB case,
where “the total number of electronic files restored from the back-up tapes of the second
claimant was originally more than 17.6 million. After de-duplication, 3.1 million
documents remained. The bulk of the relevant documents were controlled by the second
claimant, which held back-up tapes storing email accounts used by the second to fifth
defendants”.73 The importance of predictive coding has already been endorsed in US
courts, including Magistrate Judge Andrew Peck in Da Silva Moore v. Publicis Groupe74
where the court highlighted the value of predictive coding in lowering costs and ensuring
a speedy legal process.75
In order to perform to the best of its ability, AI requires data. The more data an AI
possesses, the more accurate it is; thus, the higher the value of its predictive model. In order
for AI to flourish: countries and/or corporations need to actively increase access to judicial
decisions and develop online platforms that are capable of contributing to an AI’s data set.
This is currently being done in both forms. Firstly, the LPJ is currently increasing access
to judicial decisions while maintaining the integrity of the legal process.76 This is done by
redacting the names of the relevant parties, including judges and clerks.77
Arbitrator Intelligence is another example of information collection that focuses
specifically on how arbitrators manage cases and reach decisions. This is done in the form
of a questionnaire that asks arbitrators about “date of filing, the industry in which the
dispute arose, the date of the award, and names of arbitrators.”78 When it comes to the
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creation of online platforms for the benefit of AI-programs of legal analytics, Jus Mundi
emerged as a comprehensive database for international law and commercial arbitration.79
It also serves to make decisions, awards, analysis of arbitrators and experts readily
available and accessible. As a database, Jus Mundi has “collaborated with 250 arbitration
lawyers from over 40 jurisdictions for its Wiki Notes project, a directory of bite-sized notes
on key legal issues overseen by an editorial board.”80 Accordingly, the database serves to
contribute to the development of arbitral case law, through allowing access to the statistics
that study an arbitrator’s reasoning.81
While the role of AI is growing within the legal field, there are no examples of fully
automated adjudicatory systems. Determining when such a system might be applied
depends heavily on the nature of the dispute itself. “Developing an AI-powered arbitrator
is not only contingent on the simplicity or complexity of a given dispute. It also depends
on the degree of human interaction a dispute might normally involve. Thus, it would be
easier to see such systems operating for simple money claims or tax disputes where the
outcome is based on the analysis of facts and the calculation of variables that are easily
quantifiable”.82 Along with Online Dispute Resolution, Split Up is an example of a highly
automated application that provides both the parties and judges with advice on the
allocation of property after the divorce.83 While not fully-automated, Split Up still offers
advice based on legal reasoning. This is significant because legal reasoning is difficult in
find in most AI models.
1. European Court of Human Rights
Conducted in 2016, this AI model focused on decisions rendered in the English
language under three provisions of the ECtHR. Article 3 on the prohibition of torture,
Article 6 on the right to fair trial, and Article 8 on the right and respect for private and
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family life.84 As to not impact the quality of the study, it is important to note that these
three provisions were not selected for an ulterior motive. Rather, they were selected
because they represented the provisions with the highest number of decisions under the
Convention.85 As previously mentioned, the more decisions or ‘input data’ the higher the
accuracy of the AI model. The researchers then proceeded to select identical numbers of
decisions where there was a violation under ECtHR, and where there was not. The data set
concluded to be 584 decisions: 250 for Article 3, 80 for Article 6, and 254 for Article 8.86
Relying on machine learning techniques and natural language processing, this study on
ECtHR, zeroed-in on the textual information present in the rulings.87 The following
sections were included in the study: procedure, factual backgrounds and legal arguments.
For obvious reasons, the sections of the decision where the Court announces the outcome
of the case, were not included.88 At face-value, the most interesting part of the study is
undoubtedly the accuracy of these predictions. The model successfully predicted the
court’s rulings in 79 percent of all cases.89 However, a closer look at the results shows
which sections were the most informative; factual circumstances and procedural
background (76 percent and 73 percent), whereas the legal reasoning section had a lesser
outcome prediction value (62 percent).90
The researchers used the aforementioned claim – regarding a larger reliance on
facts and procedure (76 percent) over legal reasoning – to lend credence to the legal realist
position.91 The authors stated “Our work lends some initial plausibility to a text-based
approach with regard to ex ante prediction of ECtHR outcomes on the assumption that the
text extracted from the published judgment of the Court bears a sufficient number of
similarities with, and can therefore stand as a proxy for, applications lodged with the Court
as well as for briefs submitted by parties in pending cases.”92 How the researchers conclude
their assessment is particularly informative, as they determine that the factual background
84
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of the case presented by Court to be the “most important part obtaining on average the
strongest predictive performance of the Court’s decision outcome”.93 Furthermore, the
position that there exists a strong correlation between the natural language processing of
the fact patterns and the outcome of the case, is not a novel discovery. But rather, supports
previous “empirical work on judicial decision-making in hard cases and backs basic legal
realist intuitions”.94
It is important to note, there are notable criticisms for the methodology employed
by the researchers. Firstly, it is unknown which specific parts of the Court’s decisions were
not included. The law section is not stated to be included or excluded.95 Which is not an
issue at first glance, but considering that the law section can include the Court’s reasoning,
indicates a strong material reason to impact the AI’s study.96 It would be very easy for the
AI to ascertain the ruling if it can read the Court’s reasoning of the law. This is not unique
to AI: given any situation, if you provide a lawyer with the Court’s reasoning, more
probably than not, he or she would be able to determine the outcome of the case.97
Secondly, the researchers conclude with stating that “our work lends some initial
plausibility to a text-based approach with regard to ex ante prediction of ECtHR
outcomes”.98 This entire premise can be considered void if the AI considers the Court’s
reasoning which is only available post-judgment. Thirdly, if indeed the research did not
consider the Court’s reasoning, we know for a fact that it considered the factual background
section.99 For all intents and purposes, it could just be factual background, but it could also
be influenced by the Court itself.100 The Court could easily have included the most
important, or most relevant facts that led to their decision. Accordingly, that would mean
the AI could use this post-judgment information to assist in its assessment. This argument
is supported by the researchers themselves who claim that there is a “possibility that the
formulation by the Court may be tailor-made to fit a specific preferred outcome.”101
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When utilizing AI in a field other than legal, i.e. health or business the process by
which AI is used is not entirely important to the user, but rather the user is more interested
in the results: maximizing revenue or diagnosing illnesses at a higher rate. In the legal field
– specifically when it comes to decision-making – the manner through which AI reaches a
conclusion is as important if not more important than the outcome itself. There are
numerous aspects of judicial decisions that are influenced and protected by procedural law,
and it is within that realm that seasoned legal scholars craft nuanced legal arguments. In
this particular research, it is clear that the AI frequently used words such ‘result’ or
‘department’ as some sort of NLP indicators.102 The main issue with using these words for
future cases is that there is no clear link between the use of these words for this case, in
others.103 Moreover, if the AI uses words such as ‘Switzerland’ or ‘February’ for future
prediction, it could possibly put an inaccurate weight on those words when determining the
outcome.104 If this is indeed the case, the AI could create an inaccurate probabilistic
assessment against a particular country, or on a particular issue just because that specific
word is mentioned several times.105
2. United States Supreme Court
Building on previous developments in the fields of machine learning and the science
of judicial prediction, several prominent researchers developed an AI-driven model to
predict the behavior of the United States Supreme Court. The study relied on some facets
of previous US Supreme Court predictions, but was revolutionary in many other aspects.106
Published in 2017, this study aimed to separate itself from previous legal prediction
attempts, by developing a model that met three key points: “generality”, “consistency” and
“out-of-sample applicability”.107 The model used the Supreme Court Database (SCDB) and
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“some derived features generated through feature engineering” and inputs, to predict
Supreme Court decisions from 1816-2015.108
After the results were compared to previous models, it was found to outperform all
other baseline models.109 However, what separates this model from the ECtHR model, is
that they only used data available prior to the decision. Also, the model can be generally
and consistently applied to any and all US Supreme Court decisions, and more specifically,
for any given justice composition of the Court. This was done by attempting to answer two
questions: “1) will the Court as a whole affirm or reverse the status quo judgment and 2)
will each individual Justice vote to affirm or reverse the status quo judgment?”.110
In order to achieve their “generality” and “consistency” requirements, the researchers
considered how the Court’s composition had changed “case-by-case or term-by-term,
either through recusal, retirement, or death”.111 They concluded that their prediction model
should continue to produce results, despite of the aforementioned barrier.112 This is because
the success of a prediction model is predicated on its ability to predict throughout time, and
to account for what they call “abnormal circumstances” (cases where the Court had original
jurisdiction or fewer than nine Justices).113 The goal, as they put it, is to develop a model
that demonstrates the ability to adapt and learn “online”.114 The out-of-sample requirement,
which entails that any and all inputs needed for the model’s prediction must be knowable
before the result was issued. According, to the authors, this principle is considered to be
the most crucial.115 This is because meeting this point is the most impactful way a study
like this can resonate with the legal community – in terms of ex ante outcome
predictions.116
As previously mentioned, the study used US Supreme Court decisions from 18162015.117 This input data was more than 28,000 court rulings and more than 240,000 justice
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votes.118 Contrary to ECtHR’s dependence on natural language processing and textual data,
this model opted for data labeling.119 The data labeling was comprised of several
features.120 Firstly, some features extracted information from the lower court’s decision –
which is the reason why the Supreme Court is addressing it. This can include potential
conflicts between lower courts and the identity of the courts & their decisions.121 Secondly,
certain features focused on the Supreme Court itself, such as the justices’ previous rulings
(votes or dissenting opinions), and their political preferences.122 Thirdly, the nature of the
parties appearing before the Court was considered. This included their identity, conflicting
issues and the time of the decision itself. Fourthly, the data labelling created a set of features
regarding the procedural aspects of the Supreme Court, such as the how and why the Court
gained jurisdiction, the scheduling of an oral argument, and the time it took to reach a
decision.123 Finally, the researchers trained the AI-model – using machine learning
techniques – on a sample from the previously collected data set, and then applied the new
model on the remaining data set.124 This was done to determine the position that individual
justices and the Court, as a whole, would take for decisions from 1816-2015.125
The model ended up predicting 71.9% of the justice vote, and 70.2% of the case
outcome level.126 According to the researchers “this model offers the first generalized,
consistent and out-of-sample applicable machine learning model for predicting decisions
of the Supreme Court of the United States.”127 The researchers also stated that this model
outperformed an in-sample model by almost 5%.128 However, when determining this
machine learning model’s ability to provide a framework for predictive legal decisionmaking, it is clear that there are some limitations.
As previously mentioned, the model used labelled features that consider decisions of
the Supreme Court that are reviews of lower court decisions. This includes the circuit court,
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its ruling and the Supreme Court justice’s history with regards to decisions from lower
courts. Accordingly, it is not difficult to ascertain that this input data is not necessarily
original to the dispute itself, especially when juxtaposed with case procedure or party
identity. This raises concerns as to whether or not this model can be used in situations
where the court has to reach a decision without having the luxury of looking at a lower
court’s decision.129
Furthermore, this model makes a similar mistake to that of ECtHR with regards to its
input data. Despite the claim that all the information needed for the model should be known
before the decision; there are examples of input data that exist before the date of the
decision that can drastically impact the model’s results. This information would not be
available for an AI that is responsible for predicting a legal decision. Examples of this input
data includes the time between an oral argument and the decision, if there is an oral
argument to begin with.130 Since this information is only available at a very late stage in
the procedure, it has a significant impact on the model’s credibility to contribute to legal
decision-making.131
Additionally, this model intentionally excluded the Supreme Court’s ‘hard
cases’.132 These are cases where the Supreme Court decided a dispute as the original court
of jurisdiction. The researchers justify this by emphasizing the Supreme Court’s role in
taking nuanced legal/political decisions that could lead to a “complex outcome that does
not map onto a binary outcome”.133 This exposes a glaring hole in the model’s ability to
assist in situations where a court does in fact need to decide a dispute where it does not
have the luxury of a lower court.134 An AI-model would, in theory, have to adjudicate in
these nuanced legal/political situations that might not map onto a binary outcome.135
As previously alluded to, the political aspect of the US Supreme Court and its
decisions cannot be overstated. Just by looking at how justices are nominated and
confirmed, and the nature the cases they are asked to adjudicate on, one can clearly see the
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importance of a judge’s political orientation.136 Scherer believes that it can be said – at least
in theory – that it would be easier to predict the decisions of the Supreme Court, as opposed
to lower circuit courts.137 I do not entirely agree with this assessment as the author is
assuming that lower circuit courts are less predictable because the positions they hold are
less political. Firstly, the data set which looked at the judicial history and orientation of the
justices can also be applied to those holding lower circuit positions. Secondly, since the
“hard cases” were not considered in this model, I fail to see the relevancy of the argument.
3. Wisconsin v. Loomis
The development of AI has led to the creation of ‘evidence-based’ risk assessment
algorithms to support courts in their decision-making process. These tools were initially
designed to assist in post-conviction decisions; examples of these decisions include
determining whether or not an inmate gains parole.138 The relative success of these tools
has led to their adoption in numerous areas “from policing, pretrial bail to post-trial
sentencing”.139 Currently, the American criminal justice system is utilizing approximately
60 automated systems throughout several levels of its institutions.140
The adoption of these AI-driven risk assessment tools, has led to notable criticism
regarding their reliance on biased data and their alleged violation of an individual’s human
rights. The most prominent legal criticism was Wisconsin v. Loomis, where the court was
challenged for its use of an AI-algorithm in determining the defendant’s recidivism rate
and, subsequently, influencing the decision-making process. Accordingly, this case
provides a unique opportunity to view how AI seemingly withstands legal scrutiny in a
modern and practical example of judicial decision-making. Additionally, in this upcoming
analysis, we will clearly see how an AI algorithm was utilized by the Court to render a
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judgment; seemingly expanding the factors that realists consider to compromise the judicial
hunch.
In 2013, Eric Loomis was charged by Wisconsin in relation to a drive-by shooting
in La Crosse. The State charged Loomis, as a repeat offender, in five counts: “(1) Firstdegree recklessly endangering safety – [party to a crime] (PTAC); (2) Attempting to flee
or elude a traffic officer (PTAC); (3) Operating a motor vehicle without the owner's
consent; (4) Possession of a firearm by a felon (PTAC); (5) Possession of a short-barreled
shotgun or rifle (PTAC)”.141 Loomis vehemently denied any participation in the drive-by
shooting.142 However, Loomis waived his right to trial and entered a guilty plea in two
charges: (1) the attempted fleeing of a traffic officer (2) operating a vehicle without the
approval of its owner.143 Despite the State’s acceptance of Loomis’ denial that he was
involved in the shooting, the State still believed that he was the driver of the car when the
shooting took place.144 The State argued aggravating and mitigating factors but, as within
its rights, left the determination of sentencing to the discretion of the Court. The Court
accepted Loomis’ plea and ordered a Presentence Investigation Report (PSI).
In Loomis’ case, the PSI included a Correctional Offender Management Profiling
for Alternative Sanctions (COMPAS) risk assessment. Designed by Northpointe,
COMPAS is a proprietary risk-need assessment tool that uses a machine learning algorithm
to provide decisional support for the Court.145 The algorithm uses information from a 137question survey to predict recidivism.146 Furthermore, the risk-assessment extracts its
inputs from information built upon by an initial interview or questionnaire with the
defendant and his criminal file. The assessment then generates scores that are displayed in
the form of a bar chart that represents different types of risks: pretrial recidivism, general
recidivism, and violent recidivism.
“A COMPAS report consists of a risk assessment designed to
predict recidivism and a separate needs assessment for
141
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identifying program needs in areas such as employment, housing
and substance abuse. The risk assessment portion of COMPAS
generates risk scores displayed in the form of a bar chart, with
three bars that represent pretrial recidivism risk, general
recidivism risk, and violent recidivism risk. Each bar indicates a
defendant's level of risk on a scale of one to ten.
As the PSI explains, risk scores are intended to predict the general
likelihood that those with a similar history of offending are either
less likely or more likely to commit another crime following
release from custody. However, the COMPAS risk assessment
does not predict the specific likelihood that an individual offender
will reoffend. Instead, it provides a prediction based on a
comparison of information about the individual to a similar data
group.
Loomis's COMPAS risk scores indicated that he presented a high
risk of recidivism on all three bar charts. His PSI included a
description of how the COMPAS risk assessment should be used
and cautioned against its misuse, instructing that it is to be used
to identify offenders who could benefit from interventions and to
target risk factors that should be addressed during
supervision.”147
Nevertheless, the Court specifically mentioned COMPAS during the sentencing
process, “You’re identified, through the COMPAS assessment, as an individual who is at
high risk to the community”.148 This clearly indicates that the Court highly valued the
COMPAS algorithm in the adjudication process.
Through using the risk-assessment algorithm as a supporting factor, the Court
sentenced Loomis with seventeen years and six months imprisonment – the maximum
charges for the two sentences that he entered into a guilty plea for. Consequently, Loomis
filed a motion in the post-conviction process that argued the COMPAS algorithm is
proprietary in nature –thus preventing him from understanding or analyzing his conviction
process – and that it provides data that is only relevant to specific groups.149 On the basis
147
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of this, Loomis claimed that it violated his right to be sentenced on accurate information
and his right to an individualized sentence.150 Furthermore, Loomis argued that the Court’s
usage of a risk-assessment tool that took gender into account, violated his constitutional
right.151
It is important to note, the application of algorithmic assessment in the form of
COMPAS is not without its criticism. An investigation launched by ProPublica found that
African American offenders were classified, at twice the rate of Caucasians, as individuals
with a high risk; despite a similar accuracy rate (63% vs. 59%) when predicting when
individuals would reoffend.152 While these allegations have been denied by Northpointe,
they actively highlight AI’s potential for bias.
The extent of which the Court’s usage of the COMPAS risk-assessment violated
Loomis’ due process rights or his right to an explanation153 is important, but it is not
relevant to the main point behind this thesis. Instead the main focus is on how the COMPAS
risk-assessment algorithm seemingly reaffirms the realists position surrounding the judicial
hunch and its role in confirmation bias.
4. Online Dispute Resolution
Online Dispute Resolution (ODR) presents the closest modern fac simile to a fully
autonomous AI-led decision-making process. This is due to the fact that the entirety of the
process is online; this includes hearings and submissions, and the fact that AI plays a
prominent role in analyzing data and scheduling hearings. Considered as a new method of
alternative dispute resolution (ADR), ODR provides e-commerce buyers with an
opportunity to resolve the entirety of disputes quickly, efficiently and completely online.
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Currently, several ODR systems utilize machine learning in order to handle large
volumes of disputes, sort through files and personalize procedures and outcomes.154 PayPal
& eBay currently utilize ODR to allow parties to settle their claims by using negotiation
software.155 CyberSettle asks parties to make confidential offers in order to settle insurance
and commercial disputes. Offers will only be disclosed by the AI when they match certain
standards or a given amount of money.156 Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution
Policy, is another example of AI-involved adjudication that allows the resolution of
disputes regarding the registration of domain names.157 Furthermore, “many ODR systems
now incorporate automation technologies such as expert systems, algorithmic resolutions
and machine learning in order to handle large volumes of disputes, reduce costs and
personalize procedures and outcomes”.158 In situations where a settlement cannot be
reached between the two parties collectively, the money involved in the transaction is
frozen until a judgment or settlement is reached. ODR is not just limited to e-commerce,
as its application can extend to other court disputes. This form of dispute resolution was so
successful that the European Union established regulation No 524/2013 with the purpose
of providing access to quality dispute resolution tools.159
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C. Problematic Aspects of AI
The facets of AI that make it unique are the same factors that current legal frameworks
will struggle to resolve. Firstly, its autonomy, whether through ML, supervised,
unsupervised, or DLM: there exists a high level of autonomy within AI.160 This is a doubleedged sword, as a high level of autonomy opens the door for potential gaps within the
process itself.161 Secondly, there is a stark distinction between human decision-making and
that of AI. Not only is AI capable of utilizing brute force – exploring as many scenarios as
possible – it is also not limited by our potential biases or mode of thinking.162 Furthermore,
we possess clear “cognitive limitations” when it comes to assessing a multitude of variables
within a time constraint.163 This can result in humans settling for a suboptimal solution.164
The constant development of AI, entails that it can analyze more possibilities than humans,
and in a shorter amount of time.165 This would undoubtedly lead to AI analyzing potential
solutions that we, as humans, have not yet considered.166
Being unforeseeable not only makes AI unique but it also creates several legal
problems, specifically, in the realm of liability.167 This could even reach the point where
ML actions pre-deployment could be considered as “an intervening force or act that is
deemed sufficient to prevent liability for an actor whose tortious conduct was a factual
cause of harm”.168 As the capacity for being unforeseeable could be intended by those that
wrote the algorithm and/or those that maintain it .169 Additionally, even the most
experienced of developers might not be able to predict an AI’s complete behavior after it
has left their domain – however, it is important to emphasize that this unforeseeable
behavior is part of the design, even if the specific behavior was not.170 According to
Matthew Scherer, in situations where there are victims of AI-caused harm, how can the
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legal system hold developers accountable for something that was so unforeseeable? This
could potentially leave the victim unable to obtain any legal award; as accountability and
responsibility would not have been established.171
AI is not just limited to issues of “agency, foreseeability or [establishing] causation”:
there is also the issue of loss of control.172 There is a risk factor that exists whenever an AI
program is created, due to its level of autonomy. This risk can manifest itself in numerous
situations, ranging from malfunctions to poor programming.173 This inherent variable of
autonomy and potential loss of control, is what makes AI completely separate from other
examples of public risk that emerged as a consequence of our own human behavior.174
By simply observing several developments of the modern era, such as consumer goods,
pollution and nuclear technology – we can safely infer that they went through their own
phase of infrastructure planning and, consequently, regulation.175 Building the necessary
buildings, purchasing equipment and hiring labor, simplified the regulatory process.176
Major corporations were the only non-government entities capable of funding and
installing the aforementioned.177 As a result, the individuals that had the responsibility of
installing and operating the infrastructure were, at least, mostly on site.178
The development of unregulated public risks was unlikely due to the physical nature
and visibility of the aforementioned developments. With AI that is not the case. According
to Professor John McGinnis, AI research is “done by institutions no richer than colleges
and perhaps would require even less substantial resources.”179 In hindsight, this is actually
a gross understatement. As global interconnectedness is constantly increasing, anyone with
a personal computer can build or participate in AI programs.180 This will undoubtedly cause
several regulatory challenges most notably “unawareness”. 181 How can a government
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attempt to regulate something that is operating on such a minute, but equally diverse scale?
Additionally, there is a “randomness” element, where you can have participants that are
not in the same organization or entity, working on the same AI program – as this is not
currently a legal requirement.182 Moreover, it is standard practice for computer systems to
utilize commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) components.183 These systems are developed
entirely outside the purchaser’s control. AI systems are no different. The vast majority of
AI systems that are utilized have been built, almost entirely, using code from external
sources. The same can apply for the physical components of AI as well.184
Ultimately, if we consider all the aforementioned characteristics of AI, it is clear that
those factors do not exist – at least not collectively or to this level – in other areas of public
risk, and that is what makes AI so unique. 185 Even the individuals working on a particular
project might operate in different countries without any specific contractual relationship
that defines their roles and responsibilities.186 Moreover, AI’s small footprint and the
relatively low price of AI programming, makes it extremely mobile in the sense that firms
can simply move their projects to different countries – in order to maintain a more
competitive advantage.187 Especially if regulations proved too difficult or costly for
them.188
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III.

Artificial Intelligence in Jurisprudence
“There are only two significant questions in the field of law. One is,
“How do courts actually decide cases of a given kind ?” The other
is, “How ought they to decide cases of a given kind ?” Unless a legal
“problem” can be subsumed under one of these forms, it is not a
meaningful question and any answer to it must be nonsense.”189

As previously mentioned, AI is currently being used in a multitude of ways; most
notably, drafting contracts,190 judicial prediction,191 arbitrator selection,192 determining
recidivism rates and identifying legal precedent.193 While there are no examples of fully
autonomous AI judges and/or arbitrators, several researchers have successfully created AI
models with the purpose of ex ante outcome prediction: the most prominent of which are
the ECtHR and the US Supreme Court.194 In the ECtHR case in particular, the researchers
noted that the AI relied on factual circumstances and procedural background, as opposed
to legal reasoning.195 At surface value, this seems to confirm the realist position that judges
rely on non-legal factors in their decision-making process. Additionally, AI’s complex
search engines, hardware capacity, ability to self-improve and its need to adjudicate on preexisting data reaffirms a formalistic understanding of (1) the law being an entirely selfcontained system (2) judges continuously search for legal principles as opposed to creating
them. Subsequently, the findings of the ECtHR & US Supreme Court when coupled with
the growing use of AI in algorithmic sentencing196 and AI-legislation,197 challenges
important jurisprudential conceptions about the deterministic nature of the law and how we
view the decision-making process. Nevertheless, very few scholars have attempted to look
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at AI from a comparative jurisprudential perspective. This is especially evident in academic
literature where the vast majority of articles are devoted to ethical debates,198 human
rights199 and the role of AI in arbitration.200
Accordingly, this chapter seeks to, firstly, outline the jurisprudential debates
surrounding decision-making and legal determinism. Secondly, argue that AI constitutes
an empirical attempt at understanding the adjudicatory process - that is grounded in
comparative jurisprudence. Thirdly, reject the use of inversed-AI in the legal process and,
challenge the position held by Maxi Scherer regarding the impact of AI on legal theory. In
outlining the debate surrounding legal certainty, this chapter embarks on a comparative
jurisprudential study between the formalistic legal philosophy of Weber, Hart & Dworkin
and the realistic legal philosophy of Jerome Frank, Felix Cohen, Karl Llewelyn and
Theodore Schroeder. I then proceed to analyze these jurisprudential positions in relation to
inversed and versed examples of AI. Moreover, this chapter seeks to answer the following
questions: does AI’s capability for outcome prediction further affirm Jerome Frank’s
position on the indeterminacy of the law? Does it affirm the classical formalist position?
Or does AI seemingly confirm Cohen’s position? Does AI solve the myth of legal
certainty?
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A. A Formalistic Understanding of the Law
In this section, I aim to give an overview on the evolution of the classical formalist
position, beginning with Max Weber’s seminal work Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft and Neil
MacCormick’s text on Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory. Additionally, this assessment
incorporates modern iterations of a formalistic understanding of the law. Which includes,
Hart’s partial departure from the determinacy of the law and his analysis of law &
language: for which he uses as a basis for his argument. While a significant portion of the
academic literature is concerned with the morality and political dimension of legal
certainty, I focus specifically on the debates surrounding legal certainty and ‘hard cases’
that are directly relevant to AI. This section concludes with assessing the implications of
versed and inversed-AI in light of formalistic legal theories. Most notably, juxtaposing
Hart’s acceptance of hard cases and, consequently, the partial indeterminacy of the law
with Dworkin’s acceptance of legal certainty. Furthermore, this section highlights
emerging legal developments – most notably the LPJ and the General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR) – that challenge the role of inversed-AI in legal decision-making.
1. Classical Formalism
Despite no longer being ‘fashionable’, legal formalism is one of the most prominent
legal theories surrounding judicial decision-making. Unlike realism, formalism is not only
concerned with how the law is, but how it should be. Accordingly, it contains both a
descriptive and a normative element.201 The formalist position on the nature of the law is
that it is “comprehensive and logically ordered”.202 Even in scenarios where judges are
forced to give a ruling on an area that is not as well developed, law is not created.203 Instead,
judges merely apply preexisting laws.204 Formalism’s advocacy for the deterministic nature
of the law is evident in James C. Carter’s statement: “That the judge cannot make law is
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accepted from the start. That there is already a rule by which the case must be determined
is not doubted. . . . It is agreed that the true rule must somehow be found.”205
Formalism claims that the legal decision-making process should be a closed logical
system that operates free from political thinking, as it is merely a mechanical process.
Inside this mechanical process, judges use pre-determined legal rules and apply them to
the facts of the case to issue a decision. This is summarized in Neil MacCormick’s text on
Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory where he states “rule plus fact equals conclusion”.206
On the bases of the aforementioned point, formalism expands to make the following
claims: (1) the law is rationally determinate, in the sense that the legal reasons available to
the judge at the time of the decision-making process points to only one outcome (2) the
decision-making process is considered to be autonomous as the judge can adjudicate
without resorting to morality or politics.207 This notion of an entirely self-contained system
of norms is what defines the formalist aspiration of what the law should be.208 The bases
behind it is that formalists seek to create a system that is capable of containing the answers
to any and all legal questions. Roberto Unger, a notable critique of formalism describes it
as:
“Formalism is a commitment to, and therefore also a belief in the
possibility of, a method of legal justification that contrasts with
open-ended disputes about the basic terms of social life, disputes
that people call ideological, philosophical or visionary. Such
conflicts fall far short of the closely guarded canon of inference that
the formalist claims for legal analysis. . . . A second distinctive
formalist thesis is that only through such a restrained, relatively
apolitical method of analysis is legal doctrine possible. . . . Doctrine
can exist, according to the formalist view, because of a contrast
between the more determinate rationality of legal analysis and the
less determinate rationality of ideological contests.”209
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As previously mentioned, formalism assumes that there exists a connection
between legal reasoning and deductive logic. It is in Max Weber’s seminal work Wirtschaft
und Gesellschaft where we can clearly see how he draws from what he views as the
pinnacle of jurisprudence of his time, to build the classical formalist claim:210
“First, that every concrete legal decision be the “application” of an
abstract legal proposition to a concrete “fact situation”; second, that
it must be possible in every concrete case to derive the decision from
abstract legal propositions by means of legal logic; third, that the
law must actually or virtually constitute a “gap- less” system of legal
propositions, or must, at least, be treated as it if were such a gapless
system; fourth, that whatever cannot be “construed” rationally in
legal terms is also legally irrelevant; and fifth, that every social
action of human beings must always be visualized as either an
application or “execution” of legal propositions, or as an
“infringement” thereof, since the “gapless- ness” of the legal system
must result in a gapless “legal ordering” of all social conduct.”211
Weber’s formalistic and mechanical approach to law is based on the following
thesis: the only way capitalism can flourish, is if it exists in a legal environment that is
predictable “the capitalistic enterprise… cannot do without legal security”.212 This level of
‘legal science’ can only reach what Weber deems proper predictability in the form of
rational legal thought i.e. a closed logical system.213 Accordingly, legal predictability and
capitalism are intrinsically linked because predictable law is needed in order to develop
commercial certainty, which is needed for successful economic planning.214 What Weber
considers to be the ‘modern capitalist enterprise’ is based “primarily on calculation and
presupposes a legal and administrative system whose functioning can be rationally
predicted, at least in principle, by virtue of its fixed general norms, just like the expected
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performance of a machine”.215 Similar to Weber’s theory, more contemporary forms of
formalists – such as Hart – claim that modern law employs rational legal thought.
2. Modern Formalism
In contemporary times, it is considered that “legal theorists… unanimously reject any
kind of formalism” and in some legal circles it is even considered an insult to call someone
a formalist.216 Nevertheless, the notion that – at least in clear cases – the law can be
considered to be devoid of a moral & political dimension, and that it is rationally
determinate, still exists today. In The Concept of Law, Hart refutes the realist claim that the
meaning behind words is “completely arbitrary and unpredictable” and judges adjudicate
how they see fit.217 He does this by making an important distinction between clear cases
and hard cases. Hart is of the opinion that clear cases are examples of when the law can be
rationally determinate and applied logically, without the consideration of non-legal
factors.218 But in hard or what he calls ‘penumbral cases’, he concedes that it can be
difficult to determine whether the law applies or not.219 Accordingly, it is impossible for
the law to be entirely rationally determinate because (1) there does not exist a set of rules
that can provide a predetermined answer to every case that might come up (2) complete
guidance of judicial conduct is impossible.220 Hart’s work constitutes a partial departure
from classical formalists in that he recognizes that the law cannot be rationally determinate
all the time. It is in Hart’s The Nightmare and the Noble Dream where he challenges the
notion that judges are being forced to act as lawmakers in when they are “faced with the
indeterminacy of a particular legal rule”.221 He views this act of being “forced” as merely
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an illusion, as judges do not adjudicate in a legal vacuum; they adjudicate within a
framework of “well established rules, principles, standards, and values”.222
The most interesting part of Hart’s argument is his reasoning. According to Hart, the
system of decision-making can be understood through analyzing the relationship between
law and language.223 He argues that the language through which the rules are written,
possesses an ‘open texture’.224 This open texture is the reason why rules can be interpreted
differently. The importance that Hart allocates to language being the source of both legal
certainty and uncertainty is especially evident in AI decision-making models’ reliance on
natural language processing and textual analysis.225 Nevertheless, Hart is criticized for his
position on language and law, because when realists attack a “model law as a system of
rules… it is not the law’s linguistic uncertainty that is the target, but the process of
precedential legal reasoning.”226 Nevertheless, the nature of legal determinacy is something
that Hart viewed quite negatively. The act of negating the existence of ‘hard cases’ by
classical formalists, strips judges from the ability to shape or change the law in order to
adapt to newly emerging social aims and consequences or as Shapiro phrases it “they
squander the moral opportunities afforded by the penumbra.”227
3. Ronald Dworkin’s Resuscitation of Legal Formalism
Despite Hart’s best efforts to denounce classical formalism – through discrediting its
conceptual nature, claims about the role of the judge and its position on legal determinacy
– several facets of formalism have limped on to develop a more refined jurisprudential
account.228 This is partly due to the work of Ronald Dworkin on the issue of legal
determinacy. Dworkin established a distinction between what he views as a ‘rule’ and a
‘principle’.229 Rules are what he considers to be “all or nothing” applications, they either
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apply or they do not.230 An example of this would be the signature of at least two parties
for a contract to be valid. If there is no signature the contract is not valid.231 Principles,
according to Dworkin, are not definitive. Their “weight” supports different outcomes.232
Accordingly, when two principles are conflicting, the principle with the most weight is the
correct decision.233 This conflict between legal principles is evident in hard cases.234 In
hard cases, judges use legal principles to reach a particular result. In Riggs v. Palmer, Elmer
Palmer poisoned his grandfather to avoid the possibility of being removed from his
grandfather’s will and, thus, being denied his inheritance.235 Despite Palmer being found
guilty of murder, he petitioned the court for his inheritance.236 The law at the time
supported Palmer’s claim as they did not contain exceptions for murderous beneficiaries.237
Instead of simply applying the New York statue of wills, the court considered the principle
that an individual should not directly profit as a result of his or her own wrongdoing.238
The court, ultimately, ruled against Palmer and he was subsequently denied his inheritance.
From Dworkin’s perspective, this would be an example of the principle of not profiting
from your own wrongdoing having a more aggregated weight.239
As a result of having demonstrated the Court’s ability to utilize legal principles to
adjudicate, Dworkin viewed this as confirmation for the formalist position that the law is
indeed determinate.240 In the case of Riggs v. Palmer, the judges did not suddenly consider
this an example where the law was ungoverned, instead they continued to look at legal
material until they found an applicable rule.241 This rule, according to Dworkin, is not an
example of judges expanding their legal mandate to address legal gaps by passing on moral
judgments as if they were legislators.242 To the contrary, they fulfilled the role of judges
who performed their obligation of legal reasoning. “They assume that there are norms that
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resolve this dispute in question and they are under a legal obligation to find these norms
and apply them to the case at hand.”243
It is important to note, that despite Dworkin agreeing with classical formalists regarding
legal determinacy, he rejected their conceptual approach towards legal analysis and
deductive logic.244 Dworkinian principles are not mechanical, nor do they adopt a “rule
like” logic.245 Instead, the principles are compared and contrasted based on who has the
most aggregate weight to resolve this specific legal issue.246 Accordingly, Dworkin’s
philosophy is grounded in morality as opposed to the geometrical strategy applied by
formalists.247 This is because the law, in Dworkin’s eyes, is governed by the “adjudicative
principle of inclusive integrity.”248
Additionally, Dworkin rejected the formalist methodology for discovering the
“pedigree” of legal principles in previous legal decisions. 249 Instead, he believed moral
reasoning should be the sole method for discovering legal principles, and that they are
binding because they are “morally appropriate”.250 it is important to note, Dworkin did not
completely disregard the role of judicial ‘pedigree’, as he noted the judges still cared about
previous judicial decisions.251
4. Artificial Intelligence: A Formalistic Resurgence?
Now while Weber was discussing legal predictability in capitalism as a way of
developing a moral virtue, his argument on the need of a ‘legal science’ still very much
relevant in the jurisprudential discussion surrounding AI. The emergence of AI in the legal
field creates a contemporary validation for Weber’s work on the capitalist enterprise, and
its need for a deterministic system.
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The overarching nature of formalism uniquely places it within the crosshairs of AI,
because AI presents practical, as well as, theoretical implications for legal decisionmaking. AI’s predictive nature, and comprehensive data sets present a unique step towards
the legal determinism that Weber is stating exists within the law. Firstly, Weber’s position
on the law being an entirely self-contained system is supported by AI. As accurately
portrayed by Scherer, the estimation that consumer-level computers would be capable of
reaching a hardware capacity of several petabytes does lend substantial credence to the
law’s ability of being an entirely self-contained system.252 Especially since fifty petabytes
are capable of storing the “entire written works of [human]kind from the beginning of
recorded history in all languages”.253 In addition to the decrease of hardware limitations,
the creation of complex data sets – that include judicial precedent and case analysis – by
entities such as Arbitrator Intelligence, ArbiLex and Jus Mundi254 creates a solid basis for
a more deterministic legal application. Secondly, versed-AI’s reliance on NLP and textual
analysis, supports Hart’s emphasis on the relationship between law and language. As well
as his critique that the meaning of words is not completely arbitrary, unpredictable and that
judges do not, in fact, adjudicate how they see fit. However, it is important to note, the
reliance of inversed-AI on textual analysis i.e. the US Supreme Court and ECtHR, actually
contradicts Hart. This is because in that particular situation, the meaning of words are in
fact arbitrary and unpredictable. Thirdly, AI’s need to adjudicate on the basis of applying
pre-existing data, reaffirms Dworkin’s position that judges do not create law, instead they
continue to search for the applicable rule. Fourthly, the quantifiable nature of versed-AI
meets – to some extent – the rationality and logical requirement posited by formalists in
the application of the law. However, it does shift from what formalists consider a
‘mechanical’ or ‘geometric approach’.
The formalist need for the decision-making process to be an entirely self-contained
system through which judges never rely on moral/political considerations is only partially
validated by AI. Where versed-AI and classical formalism part ways is in their lack of
differentiation between clear and hard cases. In clear cases, there is no inherent reason for
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versed-AI to not be able to apply the ‘rules’ of that specific case. In hard cases - where
Dworkin’s ‘principles’ apply – it would be difficult to create an algorithm that can
purposefully search for said principles in different cases. This is because judges have the
discretion to look at cases that exist in other legal fields, in order to determine the
applicability and appropriate weight of said principle. Also, a judge’s reliance on ‘moral
considerations’ when weighing the principles would be near impossible to deliberately
incorporate into AI – it would depend on the level of training, sophistication of the
algorithm, size of the data set and the ability to establish a clear link of how the AI weighed
this principle in relation to the rest. On the other hand, the application of inversed-AI
seemingly renders the formalist position outdated. Firstly, inversed-AI would change both
the normative (how they should decide) and descriptive (how they actually decide).255 The
inversed-AI base for decision-making would be the balance of probabilities; as opposed to
predetermined rules. Accordingly, this mode would not follow the geometrical, logical
form that formalism puts forth.256 On the contrary, it would constitute a significant
departure from the very essence of formalist jurisprudence.257 As decision-making would
transition from rule-based reasoning to probabilistic inferences.258
Furthermore, using examples of inversed-AI as markers, or values that indicate
potential is one thing; considering inversed-AI models as legitimate examples for AI in
decision-making – and consequently using them to develop an opinion on legal
determinism is absurd. While they are the most refined iterations for AI’s potential for legal
predication, they are, on a fundamental level, in direct opposition to the legal process. This
is because the legal process is ultimately driven by different factors. As previously
discussed, the application of inversed-AI in the medical field is extremely beneficial in
diagnosing. In the financial sector, inversed-AI’s capacity for building investment
portfolios is also beneficial due to its profitability. If the AI is consistently reliable or at
least more reliable than its human counterparts that are performing the same task, then it is
deemed to be successful. This is also because the aforementioned industries are resultdriven. The law’s reliance on legal procedure, due process, legal principles, and the
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methodology employed – whether legitimate or not – is as important as the solution itself.
Accordingly, the importance of interpretability and understanding how an algorithm
reached a particular decision is not something that can just be moved aside. This is
supported by the restrictive ‘explainability’ requirements put forth by AI-specific
legislation that specifically tackles examples of inversed-AI.
Adopted in 2016 by the European Union, the General Data Protection Regulation
instituted the right of an individual to not to be subject to a decision based entirely on
“automated processing”.259 Underneath the aforementioned right, the GDPR expanded to
include several safeguards that are antithetical towards inversed-AI models – most notably
Article 14:
“In addition to the information referred to in paragraph 1, the
controller shall provide the data subject with the following
information necessary to ensure fair and transparent processing in
respect of the data subject:
a.
the period for which the personal data will be stored, or if
that is not possible, the criteria used to determine that period;
b.
where the processing is based on point (f) of Article 6(1), the
legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party;
c.
the existence of the right to request from the controller
access to and rectification or erasure of personal data or restriction
of processing concerning the data subject and to object to processing
as well as the right to data portability;
d.
where processing is based on point (a) of Article 6(1) or
point (a) of Article 9(2), the existence of the right to withdraw
consent at any time, without affecting the lawfulness of processing
based on consent before its withdrawal;
e.
the right to lodge a complaint with a supervisory authority;
f.
from which source the personal data originate, and if
applicable, whether it came from publicly accessible sources;
g.
the existence of automated decision-making, including
profiling, referred to in Article 22(1) and (4) and, at least in those
cases, meaningful information about the logic involved, as well as
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the significance and the envisaged consequences of such processing
for the data subject.”260
The ‘right to explanation’ posited in Article 14, specifically subclause (g) creates a
significant barrier towards the role that inversed-AI models can assume in the legal
decision-making process. In addition to the GDPR, the French government’s LPJ instituted
similar restrictive requirements. Article 4 stipulates that the provider must guarantee that
the technology allows “control of the process and of all its evolutions in order to explain,
details and in a comprehensible manner”.261 While the GDPR and the LPJ are not globally
representative, they do represent validation towards the inherent need for any technology
used in the decision-making process to be explainable. Accordingly, using or studying the
implications for inversed-AI – as posited by Scherer – as examples for AI’s potential in the
legal field is erroneous because they would not be able to meet the explainability
requirements put forth by emerging legislation.
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B. A Realistic Approach to the Law?
In this section, the main focus of analysis is the American Legal Realist position on the
indeterminacy of the law. This is done by assessing realism as a byproduct of Felix Cohen’s
functional approach and the myth of legal certainty – as posited by Jerome Frank. It is
important to note, the realist position on legal certainty is grounded in their understanding
of the decision-making process. This includes their empirical evaluation of the judicial
hunch and the written opinion. Accordingly, this section not only acts as a critique for the
formalist understanding, but also serves to explore the validity of AI’s reliance on factors
that were deemed moot by formalists. By highlighting the different realist positions, this
section also seeks to demonstrate that lack of congruence that exists within realist
jurisprudence – a trap that some scholars seem to find inescapable. While some overlap is
necessary and does in fact exist, treating realism as one body of work diminishes the
nuanced arguments that exist within it. Consequently, preventing meaningful engagement
with its jurisprudence.
1. American Legal Realism
“Realists can be read as advocating an empirical theory of
adjudication precisely because they think the traditional
jurisprudential project of trying to show decisions to be justified on
the basis of legal rules and reasons is a failure”262
Emerging as one of the most important jurisprudential movements in the United States,
legal realism acted as an antithetical attack on the formalistic fantasy that judicial decisions
were made apolitically, and on the basis of a mechanical application of law. When
analyzing legal realist theory, it is important to distinguish between American Legal
Realism and Scandinavian Realism (SR). Operating on the more extreme-side of realism,
SR flatly rejected anything that even remotely related to metaphysics. Axel Hägerström
even ventured as far as to say that no legal rule can be said to ‘exist’. Ideas such as ‘justice’,
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‘legal certainty’, ‘rights’ and ‘duties’ are pointless as they are false creations that are not
based in reality or “imbued with magical significance”.263Additionally, since the law is a
byproduct social welfare, jurisprudence must then be transformed into a natural science
that is empirically based.264
American Legal Realism – unlike its Scandinavian counterpart – was comprised of
lawyers and social scientists. After having committed empirical assessments, realists
argued that courts did not decide cases primarily due to the law. But rather, on a judge’s
personal opinion on what is to be considered as fair – somewhat ex aequo et bono.
Furthermore, they believed that legal reasoning and, consequently, its legal application,
were merely post-hoc rationalization for a decision that the judge had already taken on the
basis of his or her own biases.265 However, realists have not taken a strong explicit stance
on their philosophical lenience towards the origin of legal theory – this is especially notable
from Hart’s strong refutation of realism that has largely gone unchallenged.266 Despite the
fact that both movements – American and Scandinavian – are realists in their own right,
American Legal Realists devoted their attention to the study of adjudication. While there
is some overlap with regard to the Scandinavian’s focus on the concept of law, the fact that
American Legal Realists are also legal practitioners makes their work particularly relevant
when analyzing the implications of AI on legal jurisprudence. Realism’s positivistic
acceptance and reliance on empirical testing, is one of the main reasons why it presents
such a unique relationship with AI in legal decision-making.
The school of American Legal Realism considers Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. as their
founding father, as he was the first to distinguish clearly between law and morality.267 In
his seminal work The Path of Law, he asked his students to distinguish between what the
law is and what it should be.268 Realists had several main arguments, most notably that
legal certainty is a myth. By this, realists meant two things: (1) the law was rationally
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indeterminate, because – in their view – legal reasons did not justify the judicial ruling (2)
the law was causally indeterminate because the legal reasons did not sufficiently explain
why judges decided as they did.269
The realist argument for rational indeterminacy was based on the two conflicting
methods of interpreting precedents and statutes. This was especially addressed by
Llewellyn who showed these contradictions “A statute cannot go beyond its text,” and “To
effect its purpose a statute must be implemented beyond its text”.270 Accordingly, the fact
that the court can appeal to either point – when placed in a situation that requires statutory
interpretation – demonstrates that lack of legal certainty. As either method of legal
reasoning would support two antithetical interpretations of the statute. Llewellyn expanded
on the lack of legal determinacy through his consideration of the interpretation of legal
precedent, where he states that precedent can be interpreted “strictly” or “loosely”, and
either interpretation is “recognized, legitimate, honorable”.271 It is important to note, the
American Legal Realist school – when discussing legal indeterminacy – did so in the
appellate review stage, which is where one can expect a “higher degree of uncertainty”.
This is evident in Llewellyn’s claim “In any case doubtful enough to make litigation
respectable the available authoritative premises… are at least two, and…the two are
mutually contradictory as applied to the case at hand”.272
The realists proceed to expand their claim regarding rational indeterminacy to make a
larger point regarding how judges reach a particular decision. Realists believe that judges,
at least primarily, rely on facts, personal leniencies and sociopolitical factors – as opposed
to legal rules – when adjudicating. According to Oliphant, courts “respond to the stimulus
of the facts in the concrete cases before them rather than to the stimulus of over-general
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and outworn abstractions in opinions and treatises”. 273 In the same vain, Jerome Frank cited
Chancellor Kent who stated that “He first made himself ‘master of the facts’ then he “saw
where justice lay, and the moral sense dictated the court half them time; I then sat down to
search the authorities… but I almost always found principles suited to my view of the
case”.274
When analyzing the realist claim, it is important not to view their position as simply
emphasizing the role of case facts to the decision, but as an empirical attempt at making
the decision-making process more transparent. Accordingly, their point, is not the denial
of the role of law in influencing decisions, rather that it has little to no effect in the
‘difficult’ cases that reached an appellate review.275 Ultimately, the realist notion that “the
law of any case is what the judge decides”276 is a consequence of its empirical process that
aims to expose judicial decision-making as not simply the mechanical application legal
rules. Accordingly, before assessing the relevancy of the realists’ findings, it is important
to understand its empirical foundation.
The bases of the realist critique emerged from its inherent believe that all disciplines
should aspire to “emulate” the methods of natural science.277 The most prominent of which
is empirical testing.278 Realists believed that legal hypothesis or the attempt at predicting
and understanding judicial behavior had to be tested.279 Accordingly, it can be said that the
legal realist empirical project is primarily concerned with exposing the decision-making
process. This is why many realists placed an emphasis on the creation of a “genuine science
of the law [that aimed to] discover which "stimuli" (e.g., which factual scenarios) produce
which "responses" (i.e., what judicial decisions).”280 According to Leiter, the realist
understanding of the “science of the law” is not solely concerned with the study of judicial
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opinions, as viewed by Christopher Langdell.281 It expanded to include “economic, social
and political dimensions” that realists viewed as crucial to truly understand the law.282
It is important to note, the majority of realists do in fact believe that lawyers are capable
of predicting judicial decisions. According to Leiter:
“Judicial decisions, these Realists argued, fall into discernible
patterns (making prediction possible), though the patterns are not
those one would expect from the existing legal rules. Rather, the
decisions fall into patterns correlated with the underlying factual
scenarios of the disputes at issue: it is the judicial response to the
‘‘situation type’’—that is, the distinctive factual pattern—that
determines the outcome of the case.”283
The impact of the legal realist empirical project has been especially important in
judicial reformation, as it allowed legal practitioners to take notice of how judges are not
only being influenced by “legal rules”.284 Moreover, it allowed them tangibly discuss the
political and socioeconomic factors that realists believed affected the decision-making
process.285
2. Felix Cohen’s Functional Approach
As previously mentioned, there were several members that were part of the initial
realist movement, one of which was Felix Cohen. Cohen held a prominent position within,
what was described as a “youth” movement – with Martin Golding even referring to Cohen
as the movement’s “baby”.286 It was Cohen’s background in philosophy and law that
allowed him to become the benchmark for understanding the realist movement’s
“philosophical underpinnings [and its] relationship to contemporary currents of
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philosophical thought”.287 While it cannot be claimed that any one individual could
represent the realist movement, Cohen did “represent the realist movement’s best
theoretical work”.288
Cohen’s theoretical critique developed as a result of his rejection of the traditionalist
position i.e. judges do not create the law, they continuously search till they apply the
applicable law. Using this as his base, Cohen launched his critique of the formalist
doctrine.289 There were three particular issues that Cohen took issue with “(1) the abuse of
the notion of logic; (2) the circularity of legal arguments; and (3) the false characterization
of legal questions as purely legal questions.”290 Underneath the aforementioned points was
his belief that uncertainty could not be removed entirely, even if the “judicial volition”
could be predicted with a high degree of probability.291 Additionally, Cohen challenged the
traditionalist notion surrounding the selection of precedent on the basis of logic. In his eyes,
the application of a judge’s selection criteria only indicates whether that particular
precedent is “good”, not that the rule is logical or reasoned. 292 Secondly, when it comes to
the judicial application of legal rules from previous cases, Cohen, as well as realists,
maintained that this does not indicate a logical application either.293 As judges tailor-pick
their own precedent for that particular case.294 Accordingly, the selection of precedent
within cases that require “extra-logical grounds” is always an ethical or moral decision.295
Cohen based this on his belief that logic “can never establish that one case is a precedent
for another case. That is because no two cases can possibly be alike in all respects…
Whether the respects in which two cases are alike are important is a question not of logic
but of values”.296
Furthermore, Cohen disagreed with Jerome Frank’s position on the futility and
childishness of legal certainty. He based this on the fact that realists applied some sort of
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standard – whether implicit or otherwise – in assessing judicial decisions.297 This standard
entails an inherent position on how they believe the law should behave. Accordingly, this
prominent realist distinction between what the law is and how it should behave is not as
clear cut as they would have us believe.298 However, it is important to note, Cohen applied
a clear distinction between the process of data collection and its, subsequent, ethical
“criticism”.299
Despite Cohen’s totality of work, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional
Approach remains his most notable contribution to legal jurisprudence. Published in 1935,
Cohen sought to develop his definitional understanding of the law by including his theories
on “the nature of law, judicial decisions, and legal concepts” in a larger philosophical
framework that he called “functionalism”.300 Functionalism, in Cohen’s words meant:
“[I]nstead of assuming hidden causes or transcendental principles
behind everything we see or do, we are to redefine the concepts of
abstract thought as constructs, or functions, or complexes, or
patterns, or arrangements, of the things that we do actually see or
do. All concepts that cannot be defined in terms of the elements of
actual experience are meaningless.”301
Where Cohen manages to both embrace and separate himself from realism, is through
his claim that realist jurisprudence is merely a consequence of the functional approach.
According to Golding, this was based on his belief that realism is merely an early process
in a “vast research program” that attempts to discover how the law works, and which
specific socioeconomic factors affect the judicial decision-making process.302
3. The Myth of Legal Certainty
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As previously discussed, one of the biggest contributions to legal theory has been the
criticism of the “worship of legal rules” by legal realists – most notably Jerome Frank.303
Frank’s critique of legal certainty can be surmised in two key points (1) the immaturity of
the quest itself (2) the fact that the law’s very nature demands it to be fluid.304 This is due
to the fact that “constant development of unprecedented problems requires a legal system
capable of fluidity and pliancy”305
Frank’s notion that rule certainty is nothing but a childish dream to portray the law as
a father-substitute, is borrowed from psychological studies done by Jean Piaget.306
Accordingly, the search for certainty within law, is merely a quest conducted by us
“children” to find a father-like substitute that would act as a controlling force.307 Frank
takes this claim a step further by stating that even the notion to desire certainty in law is
equivalent to indulging in a childhood fantasy. This notion was not only addressed to the
American people, but rather, Frank was telling judges and lawyers of America to grow
up.308 “It is accordingly that most judges and lawyers, for Frank, unconsciously accept the
basic legal myth and therefore fail to appreciate the true complexity of legal systems.”309
Additionally, he states that the worship of legal rules has dulled our senses, and has
prevented us from seeing what the law really is: “rule fetishism”.310 “A rule tells us
something about the law, but it is not law.”311 From Frank’s perspective, the law is merely
what has happened and what will happen in what he considers “concrete cases”.312 To
judges, past decisions are merely “experimental guides” for future decisions.313 Despite his
tendency for exaggeration, Frank’s argument towards legal certainty is actually quite
disruptive. Thus, the quest for legal certainty is an unreachable goal as the law, by its very
nature, is constantly changing and adapting to account for ‘gaps’ in the legal system. A
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consequence of the myth of legal certainty is the belief that judges do not make the law.
Rather, one of the realist positions is that “the law is whatever the judge decides it is” and
that judicial decisions are primarily influenced by the judicial hunch. Accordingly, a
thorough grasp of how realists perceive the judicial hunch and, consequently, the written
opinion is crucial.
i.

Judicial Hunch

“[A]nd brooding over the cause, [the judge] waits for the feeling, the hunch - that
intuitive flash of understanding that makes the jump-spark connection between question
and decision and at the point where the path is darkest for the judicial feet, sets its light
along the way.”314 Realists have repeatedly stressed the role of the judicial hunch in aiding
the judge in his or her legal decision-making. With the majority of realists recognizing its
central role, some differ as to what particular elements define or determine said hunch.315
If we are to accept its role in legal decision-making, the next logical step is to determine
what elements comprise the judicial hunch – this is because whatever creates or triggers
the hunch, makes the law.316 According to Charles G. Haines, the judicial hunch is based
on a particular judge’s personality and his or her views on public policy.317 Haines
continues to expand on this point by outlining what he refers to as his “direct and indirect
influences” for the judicial hunch: (1) direct influences include: “(a) intellectual and
temperament traits (b) political beliefs (c) legal and political experiences” (2) indirect
influences include: “(a) personal associations, relationships and/or socioeconomic
background (b) legal and/or general education.”318 This ‘input data’ when compared to the
input data that goes into the AI, is less quantifiable and by all accounts difficult, if not
impossible, to measure. This demonstrates a unique advantage towards AI models as their
output is inherently quantifiable and measurable. Furthermore, even under the black box
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examples of AI-run models – which is the inability of researchers do determine how or
why an AI developed this unique algorithm for decision-making – realist interpretation of
the decision-making process is eerily similar to that of AI in the sense that both constitute
attempts at determining how a judge reaches a particular decision – with the difference
being that not all AI is black boxed, and even black boxed examples are at least, in theory,
explainable.
In The Psychological Study of Judicial Opinions, Theodore Schroeder claims that all
judicial rulings are a “justification of every personal impulse of the judge in relation to the
situation before him” and it is through those personal impulses that judicial rulings are
impacted, as they “unconsciously attach themselves to the conscious consideration of every
problem.”319 It is in his view that if the judicial hunch is intentional i.e. the judge accepts
that these preconceptions do in fact occur and that he or she is aware of them, then they are
omitted from the record.320 This level of omission far exceeds the lack of understandability
aspect of AI, because that means that the data simply is not there to be assessed or reviewed.
Schroeder’s conclusion is what demonstrates a damning connection to the critique
surrounding data bias in AI decision-making, as he states “there can never be a judge
without predispositions (or prejudices).”321
Jerome Frank expands on the idea of the judicial hunch by claiming that the moral
prejudices of a judge – whether political, economic or otherwise – are superficial.322 These
moral prejudices can manifest themselves in something as minor as a cough or a gesture
by either a lawyer or witness.323 These manifestations can then illicit the unconscious
biases that make up the judicial hunch and, consequently, influence the decision being
issued.324 It is important to note, these unconscious biases are examples that are nonquantifiable when compared to the input data of an AI decision-making model or the
algorithm that it employs to reach a decision.
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Frank also states that judicial bias can influence decision-making in different ways.
One of these ways includes an intentional desire by the judge to be viewed as an individual
that is not prejudiced against a specific social group.325 This, almost, reverse-prejudice can
influence a judge to decide differently, so as to appear in a new light.326In support of Jerome
Frank, Joseph Hutcheson argued that “[t]he judge really decides by feeling and not by
judgment, by hunching and not by ratiocination, such ratiocination only appears in the
opinion.”327 Cohen, however, disagreed with Jerome Frank and Judge Hutcheson’s
approach that judicial decisions are “unanalyzable products of irrational hunches”.328 This
is because Cohen believed that their theories regarding the judicial hunch “[denied]
significant, predictable, social determinants that govern the course of judicial decisions.”329
ii.

The Written Opinion
If we assume that the judicial hunch exists, then traces of it can either exist or be

omitted in the judicial opinion. This is dependent on how cognizant the judge is of his or
her “hunch” and to what extent they would like it to influence their written opinion.330
According to realists, this act of excluding the judicial hunch from the written opinion,
further perpetuates the illusion that decisions are primarily based on the facts and how they
relate to the law.331 Additionally, some realists consider the written opinion as nothing
more than “a special plea made in defense of impulses which are largely unconscious …
so far as concerns their origin or the immediate power of the past experiences.”332
Schroeder continues this point by claiming that the written opinion merely serves
as a justification for the judge’s desires, which supports the notion that legal opinions are
created with the end result already determined and deliberately developed to disregard any
conflicting legal precedent.333 More importantly, while some realists believe that judicial
325
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rulings are nothing more than a manifestation of a judge’s moral spectrum in determining
what is right or wrong i.e. the administration of the law is ultimately dependent on the
personality of the judge that receives the case.334
4. Artificial Intelligence and the Legal Realist Lens
The existence of the realist empirical project and Holmes’ emphasis on the role of
predication in law makes it easy to draw connections with artificial intelligence “a legal
duty so called is nothing but a prediction that if a man does or omits certain things, he will
be made to suffer in this or that way by judgment of the court; and so of a legal right.”335
Realism is inherently a reactionary theory336 that is concerned with the functional aspect
of the law i.e. how the law is and not what it should be. Accordingly, realists would have
a hard time assessing the theoretical implications of AI and would most probably divert
their attention to the tangible AI-run examples: US Supreme Court, ECtHR and COMPAS.
Firstly, it is easy to marry both realism and AI, as AI demonstrates a transformation
towards the empirical study of law. Secondly, inversed-AI models seem to – through their
NLP and textual analysis – to rely more on the facts of the case as opposed to the sections
discussing the law. This, at least on an overall level, seems to vindicate Schroeder’s
position, which also posits that judges rely on their ‘hunches’ to make judgments as
opposed to the law. This is supported by the COMPAS algorithm in Wisconsin v. Loomis
where a judge used an AI algorithm to confirm or validate a pre-existing hunch of the
perpetrator’s recidivism.337 Thirdly, there are notable similarities between the inability of
realists to empirically mark down the factors that comprise the ‘judicial hunch’ and the
inability of AI-researchers to fully determine which elements the AI drew its correlation or
causation from.
As previously mentioned, realism’s empirical nature discusses what the law is and
not what it should be. This approach does and can reconcile with AI, especially when
looking at similarities between their reliance on non-legal factors, its empirical nature and
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some coincidental parallels between legal reasoning sections. However, the glaring aspect
of inversed-AI, that is missed by Scherer, is the nature of the decision-making itself.
Inversed-AI’s understanding of intelligence and behavior is fundamentally different from
that of judges. Rational thinking as we know it and – as the realists and formalists –
perceive it is inherently different in most AI models: at least the ones that realists would
be capable of arguing against.338 This issue stems from Matthew Scherer’s work on human
beings not being able to reconcile with an abstract idea of intelligence that is separate from
their own.339 This is because, among their own, human beings are the only ones that possess
intelligence – which is one of the main definitional problems that AI possesses. 340
In light of the fact that some realists posit that their jurisprudence is solely an
attempt at explaining how the law behaves, and not how it should behave. It can be easily
inferred that there exists a theoretical barrier towards applying the realist lens in analyzing
AI’s application on the jurisprudence of decision-making. However, to do this, would be
to ignore the ethical standards that realists implicitly apply in their assessment of the
judicial decision-making process. Cohen actively attempted to emphasize this point by
referring to his fellow realists as “crypto-idealists” due to their provisional separation
between what the law is and what it should be. Thus, viewing realism as a consequence of
the functional approach does, in fact, allow us to understand AI through realist
jurisprudence. Accordingly, by disregarding Cohen’s functional approach, Scherer falls
into to the jurisprudential trap of analyzing realism’s outcome, not its genesis. Additionally,
when assessing the ex ante outcome prediction of AI models, Maxi Scherer’s work
deliberately limits itself to examples of inversed-AI, such as the US Supreme Court and
ECtHR models.
Versed-AI, on the other hand, challenges the realist understanding of the ‘myth of
legal certainty’ as it does move towards a more empirical form of certainty. In practice –
which is what realism is ultimately concerned with – parties can simply apply these models
before or during the judicial process to predict how these proceedings will go. This
provides a higher degree of certainty in the legal field, in comparison to the status quo.
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Taking this position to its maximum conclusion, one can infer that a decision between two
parties can be reached before the judicial process even begins.
Ultimately, exploring AI within realism, to somehow substantiate or dismiss realism’s
stature in legal theory is nonsensical, as AI’s potential far exceeds realism’s perception of
the law. This is not a critique within any stretch of the imagination. To the contrary, AI’s
potential is not a concept realism can grapple with because, as a theory, realism is mainly
concerned with how the law exists today. Accordingly, realism can only be explored by
resorting to the examples of the US Supreme Court, ECtHR, COMPAS and companies
such as ArbiLex because these are the practicing examples of AI.
As previously mentioned, there are parallels between the emphasis of AI on the facts
of the case and basic realist claims – as demonstrated by the findings of the ECtHR study.341
However, AI does not vindicate realism in that sense. This is due to the methodological
holes than exist in both the US Supreme Court and ECtHR cases.342 Projects such as
ArbiLex and Jus Mundi present the most conflict with legal realism with regards to the
myth of legal certainty, as their reliance on complex legal search engines, does employ a
threshold that is far closer to a “closed system” than realists portray.
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IV.

Conclusion

The quest for legal certainty – whether naive or not – is not an unmeritorious one. Due
to its potential for ex ante prediction and societal permeation, AI presents a genuine claim
towards revaluating the jurisprudential positions on legal determinism. Firstly, while
inversed-AI studies are highly successful at predicting judicial outcomes, they do possess
inherent inadequacies that put into doubt their use for decision-making. (1) it is unknown
which specific parts of the court’s decisions were not included in the data set (2) the
model’s reliance on NLP indicators creates an inadequate relationship between the process
and the result (3) the inability to demonstrate causality between the model’s results and
reasoning process, raises fundamental questions about their potential, and consequently,
their role in judicial decision-making. Especially in light of the emerging legislative trends
that stipulate explainable causality as a requirement (4) the critique of the COMPAS
algorithm’s reliance on discriminatory data challenges the notion of applying inversed-AI
to legal models.
Secondly, while Maxi Scherer’s critique of AI’s potential for ex ante outcome
prediction is accurate, it is also misleading. (1) Probabilistic inferences (or inversed-AI)
would constitute a “significant paradigm shift” if they were applied to judicial decisionmaking.343 Which is not the case, as the emergence of the interpretability standard in the
GDPR & LPJ – an aspect ignored by Scherer – renders the application of inversed-AI to
the decision-making process near impossible. Accordingly, the ECtHR and US Supreme
Court models should not be used as a litmus test for AI’s potential. As their lack of
interpretability constitutes a significant roadblock for their potential application to the
decision-making process (2) While Scherer’s paper is mainly focused on probabilistic
inferences, she does use her position to raise important issues about the progression of AI
as a whole. Thus, her negation of the role of versed-AI is problematic, especially when
juxtaposed with her overarching position and conclusion on inversed-AI.
Thirdly, inversed-AI’s reliance on non-legal factors in their NLP, its confirmation
on the futility of the written opinion and its behavior as an empirical study of the law, does
not necessarily constitute a vindication for realist. This is due to the fact that (1) it ignores
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the implicit ethical standards that Cohen has stated exists within the realist assessment of
the judicial making process (2) Inversed-AI’s understanding and application of intelligence
is fundamentally different from that of judges; accordingly, the coincidental similarities
between inversed-AI models and realism do not constitute a vindication of the realist
position as stated by the authors of the ECtHR model (3) the current practice of both versed
and inversed-AI fundamentally challenges the realist position on legal determinacy.
Fourthly, AI’s capacity for autonomy and self-improvement lends some credence
to a formalistic position on the deterministic nature of the law: (1) Weber’s position on the
law being a self-contained system through which judges never rely on extra-legal
consideration, is supported by AI. This is particularly evident in AI’s growing hardware
capacity, the sophistication of its techniques and the ongoing creation of data sets by
entities such as Arbitrator Intelligence, ArbiLex and Jus Mundi (2) AI’s need to adjudicate
on the basis of applying pre-existing data, reaffirms Dworkin’s position that judges do not
create law, instead they continue to search for the applicable rule (3) the quantifiable nature
of versed-AI meets – to some extent – the rationality and logical requirement posited by
formalists in the application of the law.
Accordingly, despite AI’s attempt at quantifying/predicting the different values that
comprise a judicial decision – which is in-line with the realist empirical project – it still
represents a movement towards a more deterministic legal order. However, at its core, AI
reaffirms Cohen’s functional approach as it constitutes a demonstrative step towards
understanding the forces that exist behind the veil of judicial decision-making.
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